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1.  An old challenge 
Take a sentence containing an adverbial quantifier and an indefinite, and often you 
will be able to paraphrase it with a parallel sentence containing a determiner 
quantifier and no indefinite. For instance, take the sentences in ( 1 ) ,  where the 
adverbial quantifier is usually/ most of the time and the indefinite is a blue-eyed 
bear. You can roughly paraphrase these with (2), which contains the determiner 
quantifier most. 
( 1 )  a. A blue-eyed bear is usually intelligent. (von Finte1 1 994) 
b .  Most of the time, a blue-eyed bear is intelligent. 
(2) Most blue-eyed bears are intelligent. 
This well-known fact suggests that we can use sentences like ( 1 )  to express 
quantification over individuals: to claim that some proportion of individuals (blue­
eyed bears , say) have some property (intelligence, say) . What proportion depends 
on what adverbial quantifier we use . !  
Can we explain why these sentences have the use that they do, and at the 
same time stick to independently motivated syntactic structures and independently 
motivated rules for interpreting syntactic structures? In this paper, I will take up 
this old challenge. I will ask why ( 1 )  expresses quantification over individuals, 
and I will give an explanation on which we compositionally interpret structures a lot 
like those that syntactic evidence points us to . I am addressing the challenge 
because I want to take a new look at the semantics of indefinites .  I will argue that 
the right explanation involves a new view of the information that the indefinite 
determiner a contributes .  On this view, a carries a uniqueness condition. In 
particular, I will argue that a has the lexical entry in (3) -- though it is best to ignore 
the details until Section 3 .  
(3) The singular indefinite determiner selects for a situation and a predicate of individuals . 
[ [a] ] (s)(P) is defined only if there is a unique individual c in s such that 
P( c) = 1 .  Where defined, its value is that individual. 
How might we compositionally derive an interpretation for ( 1  a) that 
expresses that most blue-eyed bears are intelligent? Here I will briefly sketch one 
approach to this problem. Aspects of the approach underlie other proposals in the 
literature (e.g.  von Finte1 1994, de Swart 1 996) as well as mine. 
The surface structure of ( 1  a) is abbreviated in (4) . In this structure, usually 
appears at the VP level and c-commands the small clause complement to be in 
which the subject is generated. As a first step, let' s make the reasonable 
assumption that the structure we semantically interpret is one where the subject has 
covertly lowered to its base position, and therefore one that contains the 
constituents usually and a blue-eyed bear intelligent. Let' s imagine moreover that 
only these constituents are semantically interpreted.2 If usually is a quantificational 
phrase with the force of most, and a blue-eyed bear intelligent is a predicate of 
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objects of the kind that usually ranges over, then the combination will tell us that 
most objects that usually ranges over are objects that a blue-eyed bear intelligent 
describes .  
(4) [ IP [A blue-eyed bear] j . . .  [ vp usually [vp . . .  [sc tj intelligent ] ] ] ] 
Now, imagine a one-to-one mappingffrom some set of objects onto the set 
of blue-eyed bears . Since f is a one-to-one correspondence, to say that most 
objects 0 in the domain of f are such that f( 0) is intelligent is just to say that most 
blue-eyed bears are intelligent. So suppose we can guarantee that usually ranges 
over all and only the objects in the domain off Then we are on our way .  ( l a) will 
now express that most blue-eyed bears are intelligent as long as our compositional 
semantics for a blue-eyed bear intelligent insures that, for all 0 in the domain of f, 
if a blue-eyed bear intelligent holds of 0, then f(o) is intelligent. 
In short, once we take the view that usually combines with a blue-eyed 
bear intelligent, we can have a compositional analysis as long as we can guarantee 
two things . One is that usually ranges over the domain of a one-to-one mapping f 
onto the set of blue-eyed bears . The other is that the constituent a blue-eyed bear 
intelligent has the kind of semantics that I just outlined. I am going to argue that a 
denotation for a that includes a uniqueness condition will guarantee both. 
2. The basic outlook 
My proposal here relies on a bigger picture of what we are doing when we use 
sentences like ( l a) .  In this section I will outline some of the picture. My view is 
that, to understand why we take a sentence like ( l a) to express quantification over 
individuals, we need to understand some aspects of our pragmatic competence. 
Specifically, we need to understand this in order to understand how we determine 
the set of objects that usually ranges over. 
Ordinarily, we rely on our pragmatic competence to work out the domain of 
an adverbial quantifier like usually.3 Sometimes, we are guided by clues from the 
environment, as when I hear (Sa) from someone who sees me struggling with the 
photocopier. Sometimes, we can construct a domain for usually solely on the basis 
of material in the sentence itself, as we do when we come up with a meaning for 
(Sb) . 4  
(5) a. Banging usually helps.  
b.  That archer usually misses . 
Significantly, when we work out the domain of usually, we do so in a reliable 
way. A speaker counts on this when he uses a sentence like (Sa) or (Sb) : he uses it 
to mean just what the hearer would take it to mean if the hearer used the operations 
made available by his pragmatic competence to compute a domain of quantification. 
My proposal starts from the view that, when we compute the domain of usually in 
( l a) ,  we use the same machinery that we use in (Sa) and (Sb) . To follow the lines 
of the sketch, if we take ( l a) to express that most blue-eyed bears are intelligent, 
that must be because our pragmatic competence leads us to a domain in one-to-one 
correspondence with the set of blue-eyed bears. 
At the core of my proposal is this idea: when we evaluate ( l a) and conclude 
that usually ' s domain is in one-to-one correspondence with the set of blue-eyed 
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bears, that is because we are computing usually ' s domain solely on the basis of 
sentence-internal information. In other words, we are settling on a domain for 
usually in the same way that we do when we evaluate (5b) in the absence of 
contextual clues. I will argue that the crucial sentence-internal clue that allows us  
to  determine a domain for usually i s  a presupposition that the sentence carries, and, 
more particularly, a uniqueness presupposition that the indefinite determiner gives 
rise to . On the basis of this clue, our pragmatic strategies apply reliably to secure a 
domain of quantification. 
I can now summarize how, on my proposal, the claim of sentences like ( l a) 
depends on the interpretation of a .  The interpretation o f  a enters into the 
explanation in two different ways. On the one hand, it gives rise to the 
presupposition that we use to determine the domain of usually. On the other hand, 
it contributes to the meaning of the constituent that combines with usually -- and in 
( l a) ,  saying that the meaning of this constituent holds of most items in usually' s 
domain amounts to making a claim about blue-eyed bears. A proposal that follows 
my basic outlook will have to specify, among other things: an interpretation for a; 
how a ' s  interpretation contributes to the interpretation of the sister of usually ;  how 
a ' s  interpretation contributes to the presuppositions of the sentence; what the 
pragmatic strategies are that take us from a sentence' s  presuppositions to a domain 
for usually .  To the extent that the modes of semantic composition and the 
pragmatic strategies are independently motivated, we will have a strong argument 
for the view of the indefinite determiner. 
3. Preliminaries 
In presenting my analysis, I will be making a number of technical assumptions.  
Here is a very quick summary. 
First, I will assume that the representation that serves as input to semantic 
interpretation is a logical form (10 roughly in the style of Heim and Kratzer 1 998 .  
These lfs are trees that differ slightly from the output o f  the initial syntactic 
component of the grammar. One way in which they differ is that they contain 
additional nodes . Some of these nodes are occupied by objects that are no different 
from pronouns as far as their interpretation goes. Others are occupied by operators : 
these operators are coindexed with items that occupy other positions ,  and they 
function as variable abstractors . We will see examples shortly . Each constituent X 
in the tree has a denotation [[Xl l ,  and the denotation of a mother node is obtained 
from its daughters ' denotations by rules of functional application or predicate 
abstraction. 
To make things easier here, I am going to simplify the lfs of the sentences 
we are concerned with, and I am also going to make simplifying assumptions about 
the denotations of their constituents. Where lfs are concerned, I will omit nodes 
when they are not immediately relevant for my purposes, including those nodes that 
are reserved for tense morphemes.5 As for denotations, I will assume that 
sentences have denotations that are truth values and that they are constrained to "talk 
about the actual world." That is, a language user will take all expressions of basic 
types (more precisely, all such expressions that do not appear within the clausal 
argument of a modal or attitude verb) to denote objects in his construction of the 
actual world; he will take all predicates (with the same qualifications) to hold only 
of objects in his construction of the actual world; he will judge a sentence with 
logical form L to be true as long as on his construction of the actual world [ [L] ] = 
1 .  
1 87 
1 88 Orin Percus 
An important semantic assumption of mine is that adverbial quantifiers like 
usually range over situations in roughly the sense of Kratzer 1989, where situations 
are parts of worlds . (I won't  be very precise in talking about these objects : I will 
speak of some situations as containing individuals ,  but I won't  clarify exactly 
what this means, and I hope that the discussion will seem coherent.6) Adverbial 
quantifiers relate two predicates of situations ,  so that the lexical entry of usually 
specifies the following: 
(6) Where defined, [ [usually] ] (p)(q) = 1 iff most situations s such that 
pes) = 1 are such that q(s) = 1 .  
Accordingly, usually combines with two items at logical form, each of which is 
interpreted as a predicate of situations .  Basically following von Fintel 1 994, I will 
assume that the item that functions as the quantifier' s  restrictive argument -- an item 
that is possibly not present in the initial syntactic output and is at any rate 
unpronounced -- is interpreted in just the way a pronoun is .  It' s a "propredicate." 
A hearer, in order to interpret a sentence with usually, must locate an antecedent for 
this propredicate7 -- that is, an object that can serve as the propredicate ' s  value. On 
this way of looking at things, the problem of finding a domain of quantification for 
usually is the problem of finding an antecedent for the propredicate. In general, 
what antecedents are available? I will assume for one thing that, when the context 
makes salient a set of situations, the characteristic function of this set is a possible 
antecedent. If a hearer imagines that no contextually salient set of situations 
provides an antecedent, then to find an antecedent he must use strategies that his 
pragmatic competence makes available. 
4. The solution 
I will now show how the lexical entry for a in (7) (= (3)) leads us to the impression 
that (8) (= ( l a)) claims that most blue-eyed bears are intelligent. 
(7) The singular indefinite determiner selects for a situation and a predicate of individuals . 
[ [a] ] (s)(P) is defined only if there is a unique individual c in s such that 
P( c) = 1 .  Where defined, its value is that individual. 
(8) A blue-eyed bear is usually intelligent. 
The (simplified) logical form for (8) is as in (9). 
(9) �---->------
usually P A.S ,  � ______ 
�
ntelligent 
a s ,  blue-eyed bear 
Note that the AS J operator binds the position occupied by a ' s  situation argument, 
thereby creating the predicate of situations that serves as usually' s second 
argument. The first argument of usually -- its sister, P -- is a "propredicate" whose 
antecedent we must find if we want to interpret the sentence. I won't  go into the 
details ,  but on plausible assumptions about the denotations of lexical items, our 
A SOMEWHAT MORE DEFINITE ARTICLE 
rules of semantic composition will predict that we judge (8) to be true as long as (on 
our construction of the world) most situations s such that [[P]](s) = 1 are such 
that the unique blue-eyed bear in s is intelligent. (In what follows, I will call 
the situations of which [ [P] ] holds P-situations .  I will also abbreviate blue-eyed 
bear as beb. )  
N ow recall the idea. When a hearer has to interpret the sentence and 
understands that no contextually salient set of situations provides an antecedent for 
P, he will reliably assume that the set of P-situations is in one-to-one 
correspondence with the set of all blue-eyed bears. Here is how this happens . 
4. 1 .  The starting point 
The starting point is this : the indefinite determiner in (8) gives rise to a 
presupposition8 that every P-situation contains a single beb. 
How come? The presupposition here is a presupposition that a certain 
property (the property of containing a blue-eyed bear) holds of every item in the 
domain of usually. In other quantificational sentences, we also find the 
presupposition that a certain property holds of every item in the quantifier' s 
domain. For instance, generally it is proper to utter the sentence in ( l Oa) only if it 
is established that all of the people under discussion hid in the living room.9 I claim 
that the presupposition here arises in the same way that it does in those other 
sentences. 
( 1 0) a. Exactly half of them regretted hiding in the living room. 
b. [Exactly half of them] [A.x2 [f} � regretted hiding in the living room ] ]  
To  understand the source of  the presupposition in  (9) , let' s start by 
considering the presupposition in ( 1 0a) . Why is the presupposition of ( lOa) that all 
of the individuals in the domain of exactly half hid in the living room? This is 
related to the fact that a simple sentence like ( 1 1 )  presupposes that Vladimir hid in 
the living room. 
( 1 1 )  Vladimir regretted hiding in the living room. 
Informally, sentences like ( lOa) obey the following pattern: Suppose a sentence that 
ascribes property Z to some entity presupposes that the entity has another property 
z* . Then take a new sentence that says that some proportion of entities with 
property Y have property Z; the new sentence presupposes that every entity with 
property Y has property Z * . I O To be a little more precise about what is going on ,  
we want to talk about the logical form of  sentences like ( 1 0a) and how pieces of 
logical form compositionally affect the presuppositions of the sentence. What I am 
claiming is roughly this.  In ( l Oa) as in ( 1 1 ) ,  the VP introduces a requirement that 
has to do with hiding in the living room. In ( l Oa) , combining the quantificational 
phrase with the VP makes this requirement hold for every individual in the 
quantifier' s  domain. In exact analogy, the VP in (9) introduces a requirement that 
has to do with containing a single beb, and combining usually with the VP makes 
this requirement hold for every situation in the quantifier' s  domain. 
To discuss the requirements that pieces of logical form introduce, I will use 
the technical term PRESUPPosmON (in capitals). Let' s say that pieces of logical 
form PRESUPPOSE, that in particular truth-value denoting constituents PRESUPPOSE 
claims, and that a sentence presupposes that p as long as its logical form 
PRESUPPOSES that p . "  Then what I just said translates as follows .  ( 1 1 ) ' s  If 
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PRESUPPOSES that Vladimir hid in the living room. In just the same way, we can 
argue, the constituent P in ( lOa) ' s  If (abbreviated in ( lOb» PRESUPPOSES that 
[ [�] ] hid in the living room. Our observation about the presuppositions of ( l Oa) 
shows that, on the basis of this ,  the rules we have for determining 
PRESUPPOSITIONS yield the following PRESUPPOSITION for the full If in ( l Ob) : 
every individual in exactly half s domain hid in the living room. I claim that, in 
exact analogy, the If constituent [a S1 blue-eyed bear intelligent] PRESUPPOSES 
that [ [S I ] ]  contains a single beb, and the full If in (9) PRESUPPOSES that every 
situation in the domain of usually contains a single beb. 
Why does the If constituent a s] blue-eyed bear intelligent PRESUPPOSE 
that [[S I ] ]  contains a single beb? Because of the uniqueness condition in the lexical 
entry for a .  Since [ [a] ] ( [ [s l ] ] ) ( [ [beb]] )  is defined only if [ [S I ] ]  contains a single 
beb, our semantic composition rules make [[a S I  beb intelligent]] defined only if 
[ [ S I ] ]  contains a single beb . I will ado�t the widespread view that definedness 
conditions give rise to felicity conditions 2, and assume specifically that a logical 
form PRESUPPOSES that its denotation is defined. Since [ [a s] beb intelligent] ] is 
defined only if [ [ S I ] ]  contains a single beb, that means the If constituent a s] beb 
intelligent PRESUPPOSES that [ [S I ] ]  contains a single beb. 
To summarize, the presupposition that every P-situation contains a single 
beb arises from three factors : the uniqueness condition in the lexical entry for a 
together with the compositional rules for determining denotations; the way in which 
definedness conditions on denotations give rise to presuppositions ;  and the 
compositional way in which presuppositions are determined. At the bottom, 
crucially, is the uniqueness condition of a .  
4. 2. The search for an antecedent 
Once the hearer calculates the presupposition that every P-situation contains a single 
blue-eyed bear, pragmatic strategies will lead him to a value for P. Here is how. 
The first strategy that the hearer uses is to assume that the presupposition of 
(8) is true -- in other words, to act as though, at least as far as presuppositions go ,  
the speaker spoke appropriately . So the hearer concludes that every P-situation 
contains a single blue-eyed bear. 
The next strategy that the hearer uses, I claim, involves a default 
assumption. Informally, the strategy says: if you know of some relation that it 
pairs each member of one set with a unique member of another, then assume it pairs 
each member of the first set with a different member of the second, unless you 
have good reason to believe otherwise. In this case, the hearer believes that the 
contain-relation pairs each P-situation with a single beb, and so he assumes that no 
two P-situations contain the same beb. One way of looking at this step is that, as 
part of our attempt to narrow down the identity of P, we narrow down the identity 
of a certain function from situations to bebs, a function whose domain is the set of 
P-situations .  We do so by assuming the function is one-to-one. (Accordingly, it 
might be right to think of the strategy as following from a more general default that 
takes functions to be one-to-one.)  
The final step that the hearer takes is to choose a value for P such that P­
situations partition the world of evaluation. If P-situations partition the world of 
evaluation, then every beb is contained in some P-situation. And since every P­
situation contains a different beb, this guarantees that there are exactly as many P­
situations as bebs. We now have a one-to-one mapping from P-situations onto the 
set of blue-eyed bears, a mapping that pairs each P-situation with the blue-eyed bear 
it contains .  
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4. 3. The result 
The solution is now in place. Pragmatic strategies have chosen a value for P such 
that there is a one-to-one mapping f from P-situations onto blue-eyed bears that 
pairs each P-situation with the blue-eyed bear it contains . The rules of semantic 
composition tell us that (8) is true as long as most P-situations s are such that the 
unique blue-eyed bear in s is intelligent, or in other words as long as most P­
situations s are such that f(s) is intelligent. Or, since f is a one-to-one mapping 
from P-situations onto blue-eyed bears : as long as most blue-eyed bears are 
intelligent. 
The stronger the motivation for the pragmatic strategies I cited, the stronger 
the argument that a has the meaning I proposed. I will just note here that there is 
some evidence that we use these strategies. (See Percus 1 997 for more thorough 
discussion. )  As far as the first strategy is concerned, I think it is uncontroversial 
that, when the context supplies no possible antecedent for an anaphoric expression, 
we can make use of the presuppositions of the sentence to come up with one . 1 3  As 
for the second default strategy -- the one that leads us to conclude that each P­
situation contains a different beb once we know that each P-situation contains a 
single beb -- we seem to use it in cases like the following. I think it is natural to 
judge ( 1 2b) to be an entailment of ( 1 2a) ,  although strictly speaking this is not 
correct. It is correct if every student occupies a different apartment. It is plausible 
that we make this judgment because, when evaluating ( 1 2a) out of context, we 
make use of the same strategies that we make use of in (8) . ( 1 2a) carries a 
presupposition with universal force: it presupposes that each student in the domain 
of quantification occupies a single apartment. But once we calculate this ,  we apply 
the second default strategy and assume that each student occupies a different 
apartment. 1 4  
( 1 2) a .  Most students keep their apartment clean. 
b .  Most student apartments are clean. 
5. Why not quantification over individuals? 
I set out to explain why sentences like ( 1 3) (= ( 1 a)/(8)) appear to quantify over 
individuals . I gave an analysis under which the semantics of sentences like ( 1 3) 
involves quantification over situations . An alternative is to endorse a theory under 
which these sentences directly quantify over individuals -- under which ( 1 3) ,  for 
instance, directly quantifies over blue-eyed bears, and has a semantics just like the 
determiner quantifier paraphrase in ( 14) . In fact, one might take the view that the 
simplest way of explaining why ( 1 3) and ( 14) appear to express the same thing is to 
say that their semantics is identical . 
( 1 3) A blue-eyed bear is usually intelligent. 
( 1 4) Most blue-eyed bears are intelligent. 
Now, it isn't  hard to criticize theories that say that sentences with adverbial 
quantifers and parallel sentences with determiner quantifiers express the same thing 
because they have identical logicalforms. This position (which one finds in some 
variants of the theories developed by Heim 1982 and Kamp 198 1 )  leads to a 
number of problems, which I will just mention quickly. It wrongly predicts that the 
two kinds of sentences should contribute in just the same way to sentences in which 
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they are embedded. They don' t: the antecedent in ( 1 Sa) talks about a possible state 
of affairs , but the antecedent in ( I Sb) talks about an impossible one . 1 5  
( 1 5) a .  If every semanticist was a syntactician instead, a lot more would get 
done in our field. 
b .  ??  If a semanticist was always a syntactician instead, a lot more 
would get done in our field. 
It also predicts that the two should behave the same way with respect to well­
formedness conditions on logical forms . This is not so clear. The near minimal 
pair of sentences in ( 1 6) should get essentially the same logical form (the same but 
for the identity of the quantifier, which has different force in the two examples) .  
Assuming that what rules out one reading of ( 1 6a) is a condition on logical forms , 
we should then expect the analogous reading of ( 1 6b) to be absent, but it' s there . 
( 1 6) a. # Only his office mate likes every student. 
b .  Usually, only his office mate likes a student. 
But can we argue against the more basic idea that the semantics of sentences like 
( 1 3) involves direct quantification over individuals? 
In what follows, I will consider a sentence more complex than ( 1 3) ,  one 
that like ( 1 3) contains an adverbial quantifier and an indefinite. I think that, just as 
with ( 1 3) ,  we are tempted to imagine that this sentence involves quantification over 
individuals.  However, I will argue that this approach to it is wrong. If you think 
that a theory that predicts that ( 1 3) involves quantification over individuals will also 
predict that this other sentence admits an interpretation involving quantification over 
individuals ,  then you can take what I say as an argument against such a theory. If 
you think not, then what I have to say simply serves as a warning with regard to 
sentences like ( 1 3) .  
My tactic here i s  to consider a case where, in  evaluating a sentence with an 
adverbial quantifier and an indefinite, we clearly make use of contextual 
information. In particular, I will examine a sentence that can express quantification 
over a contextually restricted set of individuals .  That sentence is ( 17) .  The point 
is this: we only take the sentence to express quantification over a contextually 
restricted set of individuals when there is a contextually salient set of situations that 
the individuals are in a one-to-one correspondence with. 
( 1 7)  Ursula usually knew whether a blue-eyed bear was intelligent. 
Here first is something that might persuade us that the semantics of ( 17) 
involves quantification over individuals .  Imagine the following scenario: 
Background. Ursula has agreed to be a subject in an experiment, and she has 
the following task to perform. She watches as blue-eyed bears walk out fro m  
behind a screen and then walk behind i t  again, one at a time, and her task i s  t o  
say whether the bear that just walked out is intelligent o r  not. 
Scenario One. In Scenario One, a different beb walks out each time. For 
most of those bears, it is quite clear to Ursula whether or not they are 
intelligent . For concreteness :  there are 50 bears total ; for 40 of those bears, it 
is absolutely clear to Ursula (for whatever reason) whether they are intelligent 
or not; for 10 of them she hasn' t  the faintest idea (and says so) . So 10 out o f  
50 times that Ursula is confronted with a beb, she has n o  idea whether the bear 
she is confronted with is intelligent, and 40 out of 50 times that she is 
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confronted with a beb, she knows whether the bear that she is confronted with 
is intelligent. 
If we evaluate ( 1 7) against the background of this scenario, we think that it truly 
reports the results of the experiment. We might conclude that the semantics of ( 17) 
states that most of the bebs in the contextually salient set of individuals are 
such that Ursula knew whether they were intelligent. The contextually salient 
set of individuals here is the set containing Ursula and the bebs she is confronted 
with. There is independent evidence that this set can be used to restrict the domain 
of quantifiers . When we evaluate ( 1 8) ,  for example, we naturally interpret it as 
making the claim that most of the bebs in the experiment did not understand the 
purpose of the experiment. 
( 1 8) Most blue-eyed bears did not understand the purpose of the experiment. 
But ( 17) does not always express quantification over individuals in the 
contextually salient set. Consider Scenario Two: 
Scenario Two. In Scenario Two, sometimes the same beb walks out more than 
once . It is still true that most of the bears that Ursula is confronted with are 
transparently intelligent or unintelligent. But what is remarkable about this 
scenario is that, as it happens,  Ursula is confronted most of the time with bebs 
whose intelligence she is unsure of. They just walk out much more often than 
the other bears do. For concretenes s :  1 0  bears total ; for 8 of those 1 0  bears, it 
is absolutely clear to Ursula whether they are intelligent or not; for 2 of the 
1 0, she hasn ' t  the faintest idea. But those two bears of unfathomable 
intelligence walk out from behind the screen a total of 40 out of 48 times,  and 
all the others one time each . So,  40 out of 48 times that Ursula is confronted 
with a beb, she has no idea whether the bear she is confronted with is 
intelligent, and,  8 out of 48 times that she is confronted with a beb, she knows 
whether the bear that she is  confronted with is intelligent. 
Here, the intuition is that ( 1 7) does not adequately report the experimental results . 
But it is true that most of the bebs in the contextually salient set are such that Ursula 
knew whether they were intelligent. This is unexpected if the semantics of ( 1 7) is 
as we conjectured. 
What is the difference between the two scenarios? In the first, each trial 
involves a different bear. In the second, there are trials that involve the same bear. 
In other words, ( 17) seems to express that Ursula correctly assessed the intelligence 
of most contextually salient blue-eyed bears only when it so happens that in most 
trials Ursula correctly assessed the intelligence of the bear she was looking at. 
Now, we have independent reason for believing that usually can range over the set 
of trials .  We naturally understand ( 1 9) as saying that in most trials -- or on most 
occasions when Ursula was confronted with a beb - - Ursula took under thirty 
seconds to respond. The pattern of judgments that we find suggests that, even 
when ( 17) seems to express quantification over bebs, it is actually quantifying over 
trials .  
( 1 9) Ursula usually took thirty seconds to respond. 
I take it that these scenarios make salient a set of situations, each of which 
corresponds to a trial in the experiment. If that is right, we can summarize as 
follows .  We considered a single sentence containing an adverbial quantifier and an 
indefinite, and we looked at it against two background scenarios . Each scenario 
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made salient a set of situations and a set of individuals. We saw that the sentence 
could express quantification over individuals in the contextually salient set when 
they were in one-to-one correspondence with the situations,  but not when they were 
not. This is mysterious if the semantics of the sentence involves explicit 
quantification over individuals: what makes the set of salient bebs a possible 
domain of quantification in one case but not the other? However, it is unsurprising 
if the semantics of the sentence involves quantification over situations,  and a set of 
salient situations can generally serve as the domain of quantification. 
Here, for instance, is what my proposal would say about these cases.  I will 
try to sidestep issues in the syntax and semantics of interrogatives by assuming a 
simplified If like (20) , where know whether is an unanalyzed lexical item with a 
semantics roughly like this :  [ [know-whether] ] (s)(p)(Ursula) = 1 as long as either 
(i) p holds of s and, in s, Ursula "believes of' s that p holds of it, or (ii) p does not 
hold of s and, in s, Ursula "believes of' s that p fails to hold of it. 1 6  
(20) usually P [AS 1 Ursula [ [know-whether S l ]  [As2 a S2 beb intelligent]] ] 
In brief, the rules of semantic composition will tell us that [ [(20)] ]  = 1 as long as 
most P-situations s are such that Ursula knows in s whether the unique beb in s is 
intelligent. Moreover, presuppositions will "project" in such a way as to insure that 
every P-situation contains (Ursula and) a single blue-eyed bear. (See note 1 6  for 
the definedness condition of know-whether, which plays a role in generating this 
presupposition.) Both scenarios make salient a set of situations of this kind -- the 
set of trial situations -- and accordingly both make available a possible antecedcent 
for P .  If our preference is to use this antecedent, then we can explain our 
judgments . In the fust scenario, it is true that, for most trial situations s, Ursula 
knew in s whether the unique bear in s was intelligent, so we will judge ( 1 7) to be 
true. In the second, it isn ' t, so we won'tY 
In short, when we look at cases where adverbial quantifiers and indefinites 
express quantification over a contextually restricted set of individuals,  we can show 
that their semantics involves explicit quantification over situations, not individuals .  
This suggests that the same holds for cases where such sentences express 
quantification over a set of individuals without contextual restriction. 
6. An alternative 
As my opening sketch foreshadowed, my account has the following features:  the 
adverb in sentences like ( 1 3) quantifies over something situation-like; and the 
constituent that functions as the adverb' s  scope argument describes a situation s in 
the adverb' s  domain only if J(s) is intelligent, J a one-to-one mapping from 
situations in the adverb' s domain onto blue-eyed bears . I am not alone in 
proposing an account with these features:  some other recent pro�osals with the 
same shape are von Fintel ' s  ( 1 994, 1996) and de Swart' s ( 1 996) . 8 At the same 
time, these researchers make use of different building materials ,  and in particular 
they don't  assume that indefinites come with a uniqueness requirement. Here I 
want to argue against von Fintel ' s proposal, which is the one I understand best. In 
doing so, I will present what I take to be the basic structure of von Fintel' s  
analysis, departing from details in ways that I deem appropriate. 
Von Fintel' s  account is like mine conceptually (and largely inspired mine) .  
At logical form, usually combines with a "propredicate" that describes situations (I 
will call it P again) ; we imagine that the context furnishes no antecedent for this 
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predicate when we evaluate ( 1 3) ,  and we use pragmatic strategies to lead us to an 
antecedent; we are guided to an antecedent by a presupposition that ( 1 3) carries . 
But for von Fintel the truth conditions of ( 1 3) are different and, moreover, the 
presupposition that ( 1 3) carries is weaker: ( 1 3) presupposes that every P-situation 
contains at least one blue-eyed bear. 1 9  The weaker presuppositions that von 
Fintel ' s  theory predicts are, I will argue, its downfall. 
Von Fintel follows a program with two strands . One is that the indefinite 
determiner is a quantifier with existential force; the other is that natural language 
predicates express persistent properties of situations .  The first strand leads to the 
following denotation for the scope argument of usually in ( 1 3) :  [As. s contains at  
least one intelligent blue-eyed bear) .  The second suggests a lexical entry for 
usually that looks at the predicate of situatipns that it combines with first, takes its 
characteristic set, and chooses for its domain only those elements in the set that 
have no proper parts in the set. Specifically: where defined, [ [usuaUy]](p)(q) = 1 
iff most situations s '  such that s '  E MIN( { s : pes) = I }  ) are part of some situation 
s ", where s "  E MIN( { s : pes) = 1 & q(s) = I } ) .  (Or to put it another way:  . .  . iff 
most minimal situations that make its first argument true are part of a minimal 
situation that makes its second argument true. In the formulation here, MIN(S) = 
{ s : s is in S and no proper part of s is in S } . ) Together, these insure that [ [ ( 1 3) ] ]20 
= 1 only if most minimal elements of the set of P-situations are part of a minimal 
element of the set of P-situations containing at least one beb. What will happen 
when there is no antecedent for P? We know that every P-situation contains at least 
one beb . Von Fintel (as I represent him) assumes that our pragmatic competence 
will lead us to the set that contains all parts of the evaluation world that contain at 
least one beb.  Now, the minimal elements of this set are situations that contain a 
single beb (and nothing else) , and, crucially, each such situation will contain a 
different beb . This means that, in ranging over minimal elements of this set, 
usually will range over situations that are in one-to-one correspondence with bebs,  
just as on my account. [ [( 1 3)]] will then be 1 as long as most of these situations are 
part of a situation containing a single intelligent beb (and nothing else) . But a 
situation containing a single beb and nothing else is part of a situation containing a 
single intelligent beb and nothing else only if the beb in the first situation is 
intelligent. So [ [( 1 3)]]  will be 1 as long as most bebs are intelligent. 
The important thing to note about this account is that it has a very different 
way of determining that usually ranges over situations that contain a single beb . 
The sentence' s  weak presupposition admits P-situations that contain more than one 
beb, but the picky quantifier eliminates them from its domain when they have 
proper parts that are also P-situations .  The weak presupposition means, among 
other things,  that a set of situations that cannot provide an antecedent for P on my 
account can provide an antecedent for P on von Fintel ' s . Accordingly, we might 
expect that, when we evaluate sentences like ( 1 3) in context, von Fintel will predict 
that the sentences can make claims that my analysis predicts they can 't make. I will 
argue now that cases where we evaluate sentences like ( 1 3) in context provide 
evidence for my analysis over von Fintel' s . 
We have seen that the context can play a role in determining the claim that 
(2 1 )  (=( 17)) makes, so let' s consider (2 1 )  again. 
(2 1 )  Ursula usually knew whether a blue-eyed bear was intelligent. 
Von Fintel ' s  analysis (as I cast it) says this about (2 1 ) .  The denotation of (2 1 )  is 1 
as long as most minimal P-situations are part of a minimal element of the following 
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set: the set of all P-situations s such that Ursula knows in s whether s contains at 
least one intelligent beb . The presupposition of (2 1 )  is the same as that of ( 1 3) :  
every P-situation contains at least one beb. (I will ask you to take my word for 
this, since 1 haven' t  explained how these presuppositions are derived on von 
Fintel ' s  analysis .)  
Now here is a scenario that differs slightly from the two we considered 
earlier. 
Scenario Three. This experiment is slightly different. Now Ursula is 
confronted with four blue-eyed bears at a time, though her actual task is still 
to say for each of those bears whether the bear is intelligent. 
Now, as everyone knows, getting a group of blue-eyed bears together can 
mean trouble . If none of them are very bright, they immediately get into a 
fight. Still, if there does happen to be an intelligent blue-eyed bear among 
them, the intelligent one generally gets the others to curb their disorderly 
tendencies,  and manages to keep the group tolerably well behaved. What this 
means, of course, is that, when you are confronted with a group of blue-eyed 
bears, it is pretty easy to tell whether at least one of them is intelligent. If the 
entire group is well behaved, then there has got to be an intelligent bear 
among them. On the other hand, if they are embarrassingly unruly, then it' s 
a pretty good bet that none of them is intelligent. 
What actually happens is this.  Ursula sees ten groups of bears . Three are 
riotous ;  the others are well behaved. As far as the riotous groups go, Ursula 
immediately responds that not a single bear in the group is intelligent. She is 
correct for the most part: actually, one of the groups contains a bear that is 
intelligent but not such a great disciplinarian. As far as the intelligent g roups 
go,  Ursula is at a loss .  She is  able to  tell that at least one bear in  the group is 
intelligent, and she tells the experimenters this at once . But she has no clue 
which bears are the intelligent ones, and when pressed to respond about each 
bear in the group, her responses are random. 
What does von Fintel predict our judgment to be when we evaluate (2 1 )  with this 
scenario in mind? 
My answer to this question depends on two assumptions .  The first is that 
von Fintel will say that the context makes salient a set of situations whose minimal 
elements are trials in the experiment.  (Why assume this? Well, there is 
independent evidence that usually can range over the set of trials -- we take a 
sentence like Ursula usually didn 't want to give a response to mean that, in most 
trials ,  Ursula didn't  want to give a response. So it is natural to think that a set is 
salient whose minimal elements are trials, and that we use this set to obtain an 
antecedent for the propredicate that is usually' S first argument. )  The second is that 
in evaluating (2 1 )  we can use this set to obtain an antecedent for p. 2 1  Note that, if 
the minimal P-situations are trial situations ,  the presupposition of (2 1 )  will not be 
violated, because each trial situation (as well as every situation containing it) 
contains at least one beb -- it just so happens that each trial situation contains more 
than one beb. Now, if the minimal P-situations are trial situations, we should judge 
(2 1 )  to be true: in Scenario Three, most individual trial situations are (part of) 
individual trial situations where Ursula knows whether at least one beb is 
intelligent. But this prediction is wrong: we definitely don't  judge (2 1 )  to be true. 
What does my analysis predict? If as on Scenario One and Scenario Two 
we take the set of P-situations to be the set of trials, then (2 1 ) '  s presupposition will 
not be satisfied, and (2 1 )  will just seem inappropriate. If we don' t, our default 
strategies will guide us towards P-situations that are not restricted to the scenario at 
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hand. Either way, (2 1 )  will seem bizarre as a claim about the scenario. I think this 
is right. 
7. The odds, and loose ends 
Can the proposal here serve as a starting point for another view of the semantics of 
sentences with indefinites? Here are some potentially good signs that require 
serious investigation. First, there are other cases where the indefmite determiner 
seems to come along with a uniqueness requirement. I have in mind here 
"specificational" sentences with indefinite subjects, which behave as though their 
subjects denote an individual: 
(22) A book that might be of use to you is Autumn in Peking. # A book that 
might be of use to you is also Heartsnatcher. 
Second, the analysis of a that I have given is a plausible candidate for the a of 
"specific indefinites" (given that the situation argument of a can be interpreted 
referentially or bound non-locally, say by an existential quantifier over situations). 
At the same time, even the small amount that I presented here involved 
many simplifications. Throughout this discussion, I made use of ultrastreamlined 
logical forms and accordingly simplified denotations. More sophisticated lfs might 
include, among other things ,  a situation abstractor at the level of the root node (if 
sentences are functions from situations to truth values) and existential quantifiers 
over situations (quantificational analyses of tense, e .g  Ogihara 1 996,  Heim 1 997 ,  
motivate two: one for the tense morpheme itself, with scope above determiner 
quantifiers , and a covert one, with scope below) . It is important to consider what 
more sophisticated lfs might look like, for at least two reasons.  First, we want to 
verify that assumptions of the kind I made here transfer naturally to accounts with 
more complicated lfs and meanings . Second, complicating the lfs and denotations 
might give us clues to what seem now to be forbidding puzzles .  One obvious 
puzzle is: what should be said about those cases of indefinites that convinced 
everyone from Russell onwards that indefinites were existential quantifiers? While 
it' s conceivable that the determiner in these cases is just a different lexical item, it 
could also be that a covert existential quantifier over situations is binding the 
determiner' s situation argument. Another puzzle is: what should be said about 
examples like (23) that pose what Heim 1990 in a similar context called the 
"indistinguishable participant" problem? 
(23) A bishop usually respects a clergyman from his own country. 
(Glossing over some details,) if both indefinites in (23) contain a situation position 
bound by usually, then on an analysis like mine (23) will end up presupposing that 
every P-situation contains a unique bishop and a unique clergyman from the 
bishop' s  country. But this means that every P-situation has to contain a unique 
bishop and no other clergyman from the bishop ' s  country, and so (23) should 
express ,  if anything, something like what is expressed by A bishop usually 
respects himself. Wrong. Just to begin to get out of this problem, we will have 
to say that, in the actual If for (23) ,  the two situation arguments do not have the 
same value. We might therefore suppose that (23) contains at least two quantifiers 
over situations (relevant here are the covert quasi-universal quantifiers posited 
elsewhere) and that each one of the two quantifiers binds one situation argument. 
Of course,  this is only the first step. Just for the record, by the way ,  some 
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sentences like (23) do not make coherent claims -- (24a,b) for example -- and it 
looks reasonable to attribute this to the fact that two situation arguments are 
receiving the same value. This suggests to me that the "indistinguishable 
participant" problem does not pose a deep problem for my approach. 
(24) a. ?? A bishop and another bishop usually respect each other. 
b. ?? A bishop and a clergyman from his country usually respect each 
other. 
(cf. c. A bishop and a cardinal usually respect each other.)  
I will conclude with the most important, and most obvious , loose end. I 
have proposed a semantics for the indefinite determiner that is suspiciously like the 
semantics that one might expect for the definite determiner. But of course 
indefinites and definites are not identical in their use . What is the difference 
between the two? I blushingly admit that I don't  know. However, my hope is that 
we can say that the main difference between a and the has to do with their 
selectional requirements -- that a takes a situation argument while the does not - ­
and that the differences in use in some manner follow from this.  Suppose that the 
simply selects for a predicate of individuals and yields the unique individual that 
satisfies the predicate . We might then be able to get a handle on why, unlike 
(25a) ,  (25b) does not seem appropriate to describe a generalization about barbers . 
For (25b) to describe a generalization about barbers, the predicate that the combines 
with at logical form must somewhere inside of it contain a situation position bound 
by usually. If the denotation of barber is the same in (25a) and (25b) and does not 
contain such a position, then this means that we must find some way of providing 
such a position at logical form (maybe by combining barber with some silent 
constituent that includes a situation position). Perhaps it is difficult to do SO.22 
(25) a. A barber is usually bald. 
b. # The barber is usually bald. 
How about cases where we can use definites but not indefinites ,  (26) for example? 
(26) a. ?? A brightest star is usually Vega. 
b. The brightest star is usually Vega. 
Without going into detail, I hope that we can put at least some of these cases down 
to a preference for choosing logical forms with the in cases where the nominal 
predicate is known _to hold of only one individual . Needless to say,  all this is quite 
speCUlative. I would like you to think of this ending as suspenseful. 
Endnotes 
*This paper reports results of my thesis (Percus 1 997) ,  and some of tb6issues here 
are dealt with in greater detail there. The work reported here obviously owes a 
great deal to the work of Kai von Fintel and Irene Heim, but over and above that it 
owes a lot to their encouragement and support. Thanks to Danny Fox and Jon 
Nissenbaum for some last minute comments. 
1 .  ( 1 )  is said to exemplify the "quantificational variability" of indefinites.  The idea 
is that, if you imagine that in sentences like ( 1 )  the indefinite magically transforms 
into a DP with a quantificational determiner, the quantificational force of this 
determiner will vary according to the quantificational force of the adverbial. 
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2. Throughout this paper, 1 will assume that be is not interpreted and I will 
therefore ignore its presence in the input to interpretation. 
3. By the domain of a quantifier 1 mean the set of objects it ranges over. 
4. See Schubert and Pelletier 1 987 for some famous examples .  Other classic cases 
where we construct a quantifier domain purely on the basis of sentential material are 
cases where a quantifier associates with focus , if Rooth 1 992, von Fintel 1 994, 
Buering 1 996 and others are on the right track. 
5 .  One simplification to note is this.  Although 1 assume that the main predicate of 
every clause selects for a situation argument and combines at logical form with a 
situation "pronoun," 1 will sometimes leave out these situation "pronouns" when 
for my purposes here their semantic contribution is negligible. For instance, I will 
leave out the situation argument of intelligent from my logical forms .  (What 
makes this possible is that, if s] and s 2 are in the same world, then the functions 
[ [intelligent] ] (s]) and [ [intelligent] ] (s2) are suitably alike -- they tend to yield the 
same truth value for any individual in the domain of both.) 
6.  I won't  clarify the way 1 use the word "individual" here, but I will note that, for 
me, "situation" and "individual" talk about different ontological categories .  A 
situation may contain an individual and in fact nothing other than an individual, but 
that does not make an individual a situation. 
7 .  Unless the propredicate is coindexed with an operator. Then it functions as a 
bound variable. 
8 .  I use the term "presupposition" here in a way that connects to pragmatics : 
basically, when a sentence presupposes that p, a speaker can use the sentence only 
if the interlocutors have agreed to take p for granted. Though in the text I treat this 
notion as important, this is just for convenience in presentation .  The notion that 1 
take to be more basic is the notion of PRESUPPOSITION below, and the way in 
which the rules of conversation regulate a sentence' s  use is in part mediated by this 
notion -- the rules of conversation dictate that a speaker can use a sentence with a 
logical form L only if the interlocutors have agreed to take the PRESUPPOSITION of 
L for granted.  
9 .  The example is inspired by one from Beaver 1 995 .  Here is evidence for my 
claim. Imagine that we are talking about a game of hide-and-seek in which 20 boys 
were playing, and I know that 16  of the 20 hid in the living room, that 10  of those 
1 6  regretted hiding there, and also that 10 of those 16 hid behind the grand piano. I 
could then truthfully report (i a) -- indicating that 1 can in principle use them to refer 
to the entire group of boys that most ranges over. But I could not truthfully report 
(i b) -- indicating that in (i b) I cannot use them to refer to this group. Why can't  I? 
Because the second clause of (i b) presupposes that every individual in the domain 
of exactly half hid in the living room. 
(i)  a. Most of the boys hid in the living room, and exactly half of them hid 
behind the grand piano . 
b .  Most of the boys hid in the living room, and exactly half of them 
regretted hiding there . 
1 0. Heim made use of this generalization in formulating her 1 983 theory of 
presupposition projection. Not all quantificational sentences conform to it (see in 
particular Beaver 1995 for discussion of this point) . This is a potential worry, but 
it does seem to me that the exceptions fall into categories that (8) does not belong to 
(I unfortunately don't  have the space to justify this here) . .  
1 1 . The precise way 1 am presenting this depends on my simplified assumptions 
about sentence denotations;  other views could yield the same basic result. 
12 .  Soames 1 989 criticizes this idea. It isn't  crucial to my general account. If 
definedness conditions don' t  give rise to PRESUPPOSITIONS , we can adopt a 
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minimally different theory where we replace the definedness condition in the lexical 
entry of a with whatever will compositionally give rise to the PRESUPP. we need. 
1 3 .  An important further observation that emerges from the discussion of 
intermediate accommodation in Beaver 1995 and von Fintel 1 996 is that, when the 
context does make available a possible antecedent, we often prefer using it to 
constructing one ourselves. 
14 .  Is there motivation for the final step, where the hearer assumes that P-situations 
partition the world of evaluation? Answering this question requires fleshing out the 
idea more . Recall that we can resolve P by using the characteristic function of a 
salient set of situations . Maybe in this case, where we choose not to make use of 
any contextually salient set of situations, we "generate" a set of situations that we 
can make use of. Perhaps one could motivate the idea that one option that we have 
for "generating" a set of objects is to partition an already salient object, and that the 
world of evaluation is always salient. 
1 5 .  I discuss this phenomenon in Percus 1 998 .  
1 6 . When I say that p holds of  s here, I mean that p(s) = 1 .  Here i s  a sloppy way 
of spelling out in a possible worlds semantics that, in s ,  Ursula "believes of' s that 
p holds of it: in all worlds w compatible with Ursula' s  thoughts in s ,  p(E(w)) = 1 ,  
where Ursula represents s to herself via the concept E. So to be a little more 
precise about the semantics :  where defined, [ [know-whether] ] (s)(P)(x) = 1 iff 
either (i) p(s) = 1 and, for all worlds w compatible with x ' s  thoughts in s ,  p( E(w))  
= 1 ,  or  (ii) p(s) = 0 and, for all worlds w compatible . . .  , p(E(w)) = 0 (E being the 
concept via which x represents s to himself) . I will assume here that [ [know 
whether]] (s)(p)(x) is defmed only if x is in s and p(s) is defined. (The intuitive 
motivation for this is that sentences of the form A knows whether B generally 
presuppose what B on its own presupposes,  but I have not thought in detail about 
the facts . We might want a slightly different definedness condition.)  
17 .  Note in passing that we might have some evidence here that in sentences like 
our old friend ( 1 a)/(8)/( 1 3) a pragmatic default leads us to the conclusion that P­
situations each contain a different bear. Suppose I am right in saying that we take 
the set of trial situations to be the antecedent for P on Scenario Two. Then, to the 
extent that we still consider ( 17) to be conversationally appropriate on Scenario 
Two, it must be that ( 1 7) does not presuppose that every P-situation contains a 
different bear. This suggests that sentences with adverbial quantifiers and 
indefinites do not in general require a one-to-one mapping from situations to 
individuals .  
1 8 . Von Fintel ' s  approach in particular is an extension of similar ideas in Berman 
1 987 and Heim 1 990. 
1 9 .  Deriving this presupposition requires among other things a different logical 
form that includes a new item, von Fintel' s  topic operator. Throughout, I will just 
pretend that von Fintel' s  logical form for ( 1 3) is like mine, since I think I can 
preserve the essence of his account this way.  
20 .  Or more properly the denotation of ( 1 3) ' s  If. 
2 1 .  This assumption is crucial to my argument. Any von Fintelite who objects to it 
is probably also going to say that, when we evaluate (2 1 )  under Scenarios One and 
Two, we don't  use the analogous set to obtain an antecedent for P. So anyone who 
objects is also going to have to give an explanation for how, in those cases, we can 
take (2 1 )  to make the restricted claim it does without using this set to obtain an 
antecedent. 
22.  De Swart 1996 investigates sentences containing adverbial quantifiers and 
definites .  
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